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[1] Judgments-Merger.-Merger is substitution .of rights and 
duties under a judgment or decree· for rights and duties under 
the agreement or cause of· action sued on. 
[2] Divorce-Judgment---Effect of Incorporation of Agreement in 
Decree.-If a separation agreement is . expressly set out in a 
divorce decree and court orders that it be performed, a 
merger is intended. 
[3] !d.-Judgment---Effect of Incorporation of Agreement in De-
cree.,.....:.Whether or not a merger is intended, a separa,tion agree-
ment may be incorporated into a divorce decree either expressly 
or by refe;rence. 
[4] Id.-Judgment---Eft'ect of Incorp~ration of Agreement in De-
cree.-If .a merger is not intended, purpose of incorporation 
of a separation agreement into a divorce decree will be only 
to identify agreement so as to render its validity res judicata 
in any subsequent action based on it. 
[5] ld.---'Jndgnient---Effect of Incorporation of Agreement in De-
cree,,-If a merger is intended, purpose of incorporation of a 
separation agreement into a divorce decree is to make agree-
ment an operative part of decree. 
[6] !d.-Judgment---Effect of Incorporation of Agreement in De-
cree.-While in absence of an express order to perform all or 
part of a separation agreement it may be difficult to determine 
whether or not merger with a divorce decree . was intended, 
there can be no doubt as to intent of parties and court that 
a merger should occur where decree expressly provides that 
agreement "is hereby specifically incorporate.d herein and 
made a part of this decree, and .. defendant is hereby ordered 
to make all of the payments provided therein to be paid by 
him." 
[7] Judgments-Incorporation of Documents.---'A document may 
be incorporated either expressly or by apt reference in:to a 
judgment or decree so as to make it an operative part of order 
of court. 
[2] See Am.Jur., Divorce and Separation, § 624. 
" McK. Dig. References: [1] .Judgments, § 342; [2~6, .10, 11) Di-
vorce, §122.; [7, 8] Judgments, § 85; [9] Divorce, § 260; [12, 13] 
Divorce, § 216(1). 
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[8] !d.-Incorporation of Documents.-A document may be effec-
tively incorporated in a judgment or decree by reference though 
it is not part of permanent records of court and though it is 
merely introduced in evidence as an exhibit and hence could 
be withdrawn or destroyed, where such is its clearly expressed 
intent. 
[9] Divorce-Enforcement of Awards-Contempt Proceedings.-
Greater certainty and clarity may be required to support con-
tempt proceedings than are necessary to support other judg-
ment remedies or establish a separation agreement as part of 
order of divorce court for modification purposes. 
[10] !d.-Judgment-Effect of Incorporation of Agreement in De-
cree.-In cases in which it is difficult or impossible accurately 
to determine from permanent records of court alone the in-
tended character of payments involved in separation agreement 
incorporated in divorce decree, courts may properly consider 
all of admissible extrinsic evidence to interpret their decrees. 
[11] !d.-Judgment-Effect of Incorporation of Agreement in De-
cree.-A divorce decree may be given its intended effect by re-
ferring to an adequately identified document, and the fact that 
such document is not a part of permanent records of court does 
not vitiate decree. (Disapproving Price v. Price, 85 Cal.App.2d 
732, 194 P.2d 101.) 
[12] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Modification of Allowance-Effect 
of Agreement of Parties.-Where property settlement incor-
porated by reference in interlocutory divorce decree is an inte-
grated bargain, monthly payments for support and mainte-
nance of wife may not be modified contrary to its terms. 
[13] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Modification of Allowance-Effect 
of Agreement of Parties.-\Vhere property settlement agree-
ment incorporated by reference in interlocutory divorce decree 
provides that husband shall make payments totaling $18,000 
per year or 10 per cent of his gross income as therein defined, 
whichever is less, but in no event is he to pay less than $9,000 
per year unless his gross income falls below $90,000 per year 
and so continues for a period of one year or more, for any 
reason except his wilful refusal or neglect to seek, obtain or 
accept employment, and if his income does fall below $90,000 
per year for other than excepted reasons and so continues for 
a year or more, the agreement provides that he may petition 
court in divorce action to reduce payments until his income 
again rises to $90,000 or more, court has jurisdiction to modify 
payments only in accordance with agreement . 
• 
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los An-
geles County denying motion to modify terms of a property 
settlement agreement incorporated in a j rrdgment of divorce. 
Elmer D. Doyle, Judge. Affirmed. 
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Jerry Giesler and Robert E. Ford for Appellant. 
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Loeb & Loeb, Herman F. Selvin and Harry L. Gershon for 
Respondent. 
TRA. YNOR, J.-On October 11, 1941, plaintiff Liliane 
Carre Flynn and her husband, defendant Errol Flynn, ex-
ecuted a separation agreement providing fo~on of 
their community property and the support and maintenance 
of plaintiff and the minor child of the parties. The agree-
ment also provided that in any action for divorce brought 
by either party ''this agreement may be approved by [the] 
court and that the terms and provisions hereof may be made 
and become a part of and incorporated in any decree which 
may be made by such court, and the parties ordered to comply 
with the provisions hereof.'' In 1942, plaintiff was awarded 
a divorce from defendant, and the interlocutory decree pro-
vided that ''The property settlement agreement between the 
parties hereto dated October 11, 1941 and received in evi-
dence herein, is hereby ratified, approved and confirmed and 
the same is hereby specifically incorporated herein and made 
a part of this decree, and defendant is hereby ordered to 
make all of the payments provided therein to be paid by 
him, at the times and in the manner therein provided, and 
plaintiff and defendant are hereby ordered to comply in all 
respects with each and all of the terms and provisions of 
said agreement and to perform all their obligations there-
under as therein provided.'' The final judgment incorporated 
the foregoing provision of the interlocutory decree by ref-
erence. 
In 1950 defendant petitioned the court to order a reduc-
tion in the monthly payments provided in the agreement 
on the ground of changed circumstances. In October, 1951, 
the court entered its order denying defendant's motion on 
the ground that it lacked jurisdiction to modify the inter-
locutory decree because the property settlement agreement 
was incorporated by reference only. Defendant has appealed. 
Defendant contends that the quoted provision of the inter-
locutory decree merged the agreement into the decree and 
that therefore the court had continuing jurisdiction under 
section 139 of the Civil Code to modify the provisions for 
support and maintenance. Plaintiff contends, on the other 
hand, that since the agreement was incorporated by reference 
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only, a merger did not occur, and that in any event modifica-
tion was precluded by the terms of the agreement. 
[1] Merger is the substitution of rights and duties under 
the judgment or the decree for those under the agreement 
or cause of action sued upon. (See Rest., Judgments, § 47, 
Comment a; Hmtgh v. Hough, 26 Cal.2d 605, 610 [160 
P.2d 15]; Timrn v. McCartney, 30 Cal.App.2d 241, 248 [85 
P.2d 920].) The question as to what extent, if any, a merger 
has occurred, when a separation agreement has been presented 
to the court in a divorce action, arises in various situations. 
Thus, it may be necessary to determine whether or not con-
tempt will lie to enforce the agreement, whether or not 
other judgment remedies, such as execution or a suit on the 
judgment, are available, whether or not an action may still 
be maintained on the agreement itself, and whether or not 
there is an order of the court that may be modified under 
the provisions of section 139 of the Civil Code. 
In any of these situations it is first necessary to determine 
whether the parties and the court intended a merger. [2] If 
the agreement is expressly set out in the decree, and the court 
orders that it be performed, it is clear that a merger is 
intended. (Plummer v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.2d 158, 165 
[124 P.2d 5]; Lazar v. Superior Court, 16 Cal.2d 617, 620 
[107 P.2d 249] .) On the other hand, the parties may intend 
only to have the validity of the agreement established, and 
not to have it become a part of the decree enforceablfi as 
such. (See Plwrnrner v. Superior Cottrt, 20 Cal.2d 158, 164 
[124 P.2d 5]; Howarth v. Howarth, 81 Cal.App.2d 266, 272 
[183 P.2d 670] ; Baxter v. Baxter, 3 Cal.App.2d 676, 685 
[40 P.2d 536]; Schnerr v. Schnerr, 128 Cal.App. 363, 368 
[17 P.2d 749] .) [3] Whether or not a merger is intended, 
the agreement may be incorporated into the decree either 
expressly or by reference. [4] If a merger is not intended, 
the purpose of incorporation will be only to identify the 
agreement so as to render its validity res judicata in any 
subsequent action based upon it. (Howarth v. Howarth, 
81 Cal.App.2d 266, 272 [183 P.2d 670]; Baxter v. Baxter, 
3 Cal.App.2d 676, 685 [40 P.2d 536]; see Queen v. Queen, 
44 Cal.App.2d 475, 479, 482 [112 P.2d 755] .) [5] If a 
merger is intended, the purpose of incorporation is, of course, 
to make the agreement an operative part of the decree. 
['6] In the absence of an express order to perform all or 
part of the agreement, it may be difficult to determine whether 
or not a merger was intended. (See Plummer v. Superior 
Jan. 1954] FLYNN v. FLYNN 
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Court, 20 Cal.2d 158, 165 [124 P.2d 5] ; Lazar v. Superior 
Court, 16 Cal.2d 617, 620 [107 P.2d 249]; 1 .Armstrong, 
California Family Law, pp. 423-427; cf., Kent v. Superior 
Court, 106 Cal..App.2d 593, 595-596 [235 P.2d 420]; Young 
v. Superior Court, 105 Cal..App.2d 65, 66-67 [233 P.2d 39] ; 
Shogren v. Superior Court, 93 Cal..App.2d 356, 364 [209 P.2d 
108] .) In the present case, however, there can be no doubt 
as to the intent of the parties and the court that a merger 
should occur. Thus, the decree provided that the agreement 
"is- hereby specifically incorporated herein and made a part 
of this decree, and defendant is hereby ordered to make all 
of the payments provided therein to be paid by him. . . . '' 
Once it is determined that a merger was intended, it is 
necessary to decide whether the decree has the requisite for-
malities to permit its enforcement in place of the agreement 
it was intended to supersede. [7] It is settled that a docu-
ment may be incorporated either expressly or by apt refer-
ence into a judgment or decree so as to make it an operative 
part of the order of the court. (Fecleml Farm Mtg. Corp. v. 
Sandberg, 35 Cal.2d 1, 3 [215 P.2d 721] ; Title Ins. Co. v. 
Miller,& Lux, Inc., 183 Cal. 71, 89, 90 [190 P. 433] ; Horton 
v. Winbigler, 175 Cal. 149, 158-159 [165 P. 423]; Hogue v. 
Fanning, 73 Cal. 54, 57 [14 P. 560] ; Kelly v. McKibben, 54 
Cal. 192, 193-194; Kittle v. Lang, 107 Cal..App.2d 604, 612 
[237 P.2d 673] ; Petry v. Super'iOJ' Court, 46 Cal..App.2d 756, 
760 [116 P.2d 954]; Ex parte Weiler, 106 Cal..App. 485, 488 
[289 P. 645] .) [8] Plaintiff contends, however, that a docu-
ment may not effectively be incorporated by reference unless 
it is part of the permanent records of the court. She points 
out that since in this case the agreement was merely intro-
duced in evidence as an exhibit, it could be withdrawn or 
destroyed, and that therefore interested parties could not by 
searching the records of the court "construct a complete pic-
ture of the rights and obligations of the parties." (See Price 
v. Price, 85 CaL~pp.2d 732, 735 [194 P.2d 101] .) These 
considerations may justify modifying the interlocutory decree 
on appeal to require that the agreement be attached to the 
decree. \Ve do not believe, however, that they are sufficient 
to require us to hold that the decree, now final, is insufficient 
to effect its clearly stated intent. 
It is unne~cessary to decide whether the fact that the agree-
ment was incorporated by reference only prevents its enforce-
ment by contempt proceedings. (See Shogren v. Superior 
Court, 93 Cal..App.2d 356, 364 [209 P.2d 108]; cf., City of 
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v·ernon v. Court, 38 Ca1.2d 509, 513-514 [241 P.2d 
243] .) Greater certainty and clarity may be required 
to support such than are necessary to support 
other judgment rrmedies or establish the agreement as part 
of the order of the court for modification purposes. (See 
Pl~tmrrte1~ v. Cmcrt, 20 Ca1.2d 158, 164-165 [124 
P.2d 5]; 39 Cal.L.llev. 250, 252.) Moreover, we are not here 
concerned with the rights of third parties who may have dealt 
with plaintiff or defendant IYith respect to the specific prop-
erty covered by the in ignorance of its terms. \Ve 
are concerned only with the provisions of the agreement pro-
viding for monthly payments in litigation between the parties 
themselves. Under these circumstances, the necessity of refer-
ring to an extrinsic document presents no insuperable barrier 
to giving effect to the decree, as is demonstrated by the many 
cases where the court in modification proceedings has taken 
extrinsic evidence to determine whether the provision for 
monthly payments was one for alimony subject to modifica-
tion or part of a property settlement not subject to modifi-
cation. (See, e. g., Tuttle v. Tuttle, 38 Cal.2d 419, 420-422 
[240 P.2cl 587] ; Codorniz v. Codoniiz, 34 Cal.2d 811, 815 
[215 P.2cl 32] .) [10] Thus, in cases in which it is difficult 
or impossible accurately to determine from the permanent 
records of the court alone the intended character of the pay-
ments involved, courts do not hesitate to consider all of the 
admissible extrinsic evidence correctly to interpret their 
decrees. Certainly no greater difficulties are presented by per-
mitting reference to an extrinsic document to give effect to 
the clearly expressed intent of the decree. [11] Thus in 
this case, the decree may be given its intended effect by re-
ferring to an adequately identified document, and the fact 
that the document is not a part of the permanent records 
of the court does not vitiate the decree. (Goat man v. F~tller, 
191 Cal. 245, 251 [216 P. 35] ; De Sepulved.a v. Baugh, 74 
Cal. 1168, 474 [16 P. 223, 5 Am.St.Rep. 455]; Kittle v. Lang, 
107 Cal.App.2d 604, 612 [237 P.2d 673]; JJicLean v. Ladewig, 
2 Cal.App.2d 21, 25-26 [37 P.2d 502]; see, also, Newport v. 
Hatton, 195 Cal. 132, 156 [231 P. 987]; Rosenthal v.JJf.atthews, 
100 Cal. 81, 83 [34 P. 624] .) Price v. Price, 85 Cal.App.2d 
732 [194 P.2d 101], is contrary to the foregoing authorities 
and is disapproved. 
[12] An examination of the property settlenient incorpo-
rated by reference in the interlocutory decree makes clear that 
it is an integrated bargain of the type considered in Dexter v. 
Jan. 1954] FLYNN v. FLYNN 
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Dexter, ante, p. 36 [265 P.2d 873], and Fox v. Fox, 
ante, p. 49 [265 P.2d 881]. Accordingly, the provi-
sion for monthly payments may not be modified contrary to 
its terms. [13] The agreement provides that defendant shall 
make payments totaling $18,000 per year or 10 per cent of 
his gross income as therein defined, whichever is less. In 
no event, however, is he to pay less than $9,000 per year unless 
his gross income falls below the sum of $90,000 per year 
and so continues for a period of one year or more, for any 
reason except his wilful refusal or neglect to seek, obtain 
or accept employment. If his income does fall below $90,000 
per year for other than the excepted reasons and so continues 
for a year or more, the agreement provides that he may peti-
tion the court in the divorce action to reduce the payments 
until his income again rises to $90,000 a year or more. Since 
the parties have provided that the court may modify the 
payments ordered pursuant to the terms of their agreement, 
the court has jurisdiction to do so in accordance with the 
agreement. (Miller v. Superior Court, 9 Cal.2d 733, 740 
[72 P.2c1 868] ; Hogarty v. Hogarty, 188 Cal. 625, 628 [206 
P. 79] ; see Fox v. Fox, ante, p. 49 [265 P.2d 881] .) At 
the time the order was entered in this case, however, the 
record indicates that, although defendant had been unable 
to work for several months, his income had not remained 
below $90,000 for one year, and therefore an order reducing 
the payments would have been improper. He may renew his 
motion for a reduction in the monthly payments in accordance 
with the terms of the property settlement agreement any 
time the facts so justify. 
The order is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., 
concurred. 
SCHAUER, ,J.-I concur in the judgment. I do not agree 
that by the mere fiat of a declaration in a judgment, when 
upon the face of the judgment itself the falsity of the declara-
tion is manifest, this court or anyone else is bound, or even 
entitled, to accept the falsity as verity. 
The statement in the decree in this case that "The property 
settlement agreement between the parties hereto ... is hereby 
specifically incorporated herein and made a part of this de-
cree" undoubtedly was intended to be verity but the most 
casual inspection of the entire judgment (or the judgment 
62 FLYNN v. FLYNN [42 C.2d 
roll) discloses that in truth the agreement IS not "incorpo-
rated'' therein or ''made a part'' thereof. ''In no case 
is a judgment effectual for any purpose until entered.'' 
(Code Civ. Proc., § 664.) To enter a judgment means to 
copy it in the "judgment book" so that it becomes a perma-
nent and public record (see Code Civ. Pro c., § 668), so that 
he who reads may know its content. Any portion of a judg-
ment not entered in the judgment book would be ineffectual 
for any purpose. If the clerk by error omitted to enter any 
part of a judgment which had been filed, the error of the 
. ministerial officer could be corrected; but if he has performed 
his duty and the judgment as entered is truly the judgment 
as rendered, and that judgment has become final, then neither 
this court nor any other court or person has power to add 
words to the language of that judgment. 
Neither do I agree with implications in the majority opinion 
that a court may arbitrarily disregard the whole or any 
portion of a property settlement agreement which has been 
fairly executed. Husband and wife are competent to contract 
with each other in respect to property rights to the same 
extent "which either might if unmarried." ( Civ. Code, 
§§ 158, 159.) When divorce is contemplated, public policy 
favors the settlement of property rights by agreement. The 
most basic rules governing freedom to contract and the in-
tegrity of contracts require that agreements between com-
petent parties, fairly entered into and with a good consid-
t-ration, be respected. 
The trial court correctly denied defendant's motion. 
CARTER, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-! concur in the 
affirmance of the order, but dissent as to some of the reason-
ing set forth in the majority opinion. 
In the case at bar, the interlocutory decree provided that 
''The property settlement agreement between the parties 
hereto dated October 11, 1941, and received in evidence herein, 
is hereby ratified, approved and confirmed and the same is 
hereby specifically incorporated herein and made a part of 
this decree, and defendant is hereby ordered to make all of 
the payments provided therein to be paid by him, at the 
times and in the manner therein provided, and plaintiff and 
defendant are hereby ordered to comply in all respects with 
each and all of the terms aud provisions of said agreement 
and to perform all their obligations thereunder as therein 
provided.'' This provision of the interlocutory decree was 
,Jan.1954] FLYNN V. FLYNN 
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incorporated in the final judgment by reference. In the 
majority opinion it is held that the agreement entered into 
between the parties was an integrated property settlement 
agreement which could not be modified by the court in the 
absence of another agreement between the parties. With this 
holding I agree. I do not agree that the paragTaph above 
quoted is sufficient to merge the agreement into the inter-
locutory decree of divorce. 
I am also of the opinion that if the decree does not embody 
the agreement either in substance or in haec verba, it is not 
an operative part of it and may not be enforced as a part of 
the decree. 'l'his is true even though the agreement may have 
been introduced in evidence and approved by the court. If 
the agreement is merely introduced in evidence as an exhibit, 
as it undoubtedly was here, it could be withdrawn or destroyed 
and interested parties could not, by searching the records 
of the court ''construct a complete picture of the rights and 
obligations of the parties" (Price v. Price, 85 Cal.App.2d 732, 
735 [194 P.2d 101] ). 
In Howarth v. Howarth, 81 Cal.App.2d 266 [183 P.2d 670], 
the question was whether an action for support money would 
lie on an agreement for support where the court granting the 
divorce decree (Utah) approved the agreement but did not 
embody it in the decree. It was held that an action would 
lie on the agreement but not the decree. (See, also, Taylor 
v. Taylor, 39 Cal.App.2d 518 [103 P.2d 575]; Ro'bertson v. 
Robertson, 34 Cal.App.2d 113 [93 P.2d 175] ; Ross v. Ross, 
1 Cal.2d 368 [35 P.2d 316] .) It should be obvious that where 
the agreement has not been properly embodied in the decree 
but the court purports to order performance of it and makes 
no other provision for support or division of property, it either 
has not passed upon the questions of support, or has, in effect, 
denied alimony. Indeed, where a decree has made no provi-
sion for alimony, the court cannot later modify it to provide 
for alimony. This is true unless the court in some author-
ized manner has reserved jurisdiction to do so. (Estate of 
B1·ooks, 28 Cal.2d 748 [171 P.2d 724]; Monroe v. Superior 
Cma·t, 28 Cal.2d 427 [170 P.2d 473]; Long v. Long, 17 Ca1.2d 
409 [110 P.2d 383]; O'Brien v. O'Brien, 130 Cal. 409 [62 P. 
598] ; Howell v. Howell, 104 Cal. 45 [37 P. 770, 43 Am.St.Rep. 
70].) The mere confirmation or approval of the agreement 
without embodying it in the decree, at most, determines that 
the agreement is valid and may be enforced in a separate 
action between the parties. (Price v. Price, 85 Cal..App.2d 
64 FLYNN v. FLYNN [42 C.2d 
732 [194 P.2d 101] .) If the agreement is an integrated prop-
erty settlement agreement, or if it is a valid agreement entered 
into between the spouses for the support and maintenance 
of one of them, it may not, even if embodied in the decree, 
be modified without the consent of both parties. (See Fox v. 
Fox, ante, p. 49 [265 P.2d 881] ; Dexter v. Dexter, ante, 
p. 36 [265 P.2d 873] .) 
A separation agreement, whether it involves property rights 
or support allowances, or both, has not been embodied in the 
decree for the purpose of merger, or enforcement by contempt 
proceedings unless it is set forth in full, or in substance, in 
the decree itself or is physically attached to the decree and 
expressly made a part thereof by the language of the decree 
and compliance with its terms is ordered by the decree. As 
was said in Price v. P1·ice, supra: '' ... there is a difference 
for if there is an actual incorporation of the agreement into 
the decree, the decree standing alone then carries within itself 
the complete measure of the rights and obligations of the 
parties. In the court's files, the decree or judgment itself 
supplies all the information necessary to whomsoever may be 
intere::;ted. If recorded it announces to the world the re-
spective interests of the parties in any property involved. 
''If on the other hand the agreement is made a part of 
the decree by reference .only the above is not true. One search-
ing the file could not construct a complete picture of the 
rights and obligations of the parties from the decree or judg-
ment alone. Reference might be to an exhibit attached to a 
pleading, to another judgment, or even to an agreement offered 
in evidence and withdrawn and not available as a part of 
any public record. In such a case it would not follow that 
the value attaching to such an unincorporated document would 
be 'only historical.' It or a true copy thereof would of neces-
sity have to be sought out and produced in order to determine 
what the complete judgment actually provided. If it could 
not be produced, or its terms definitely established, then that 
part of the judgment represented by it could not be enforced. 
In particular it could not be enforced by contempt proceed-
ings." (Emphasis added.) In the majority opinion, it is 
said that the Price case, being contrary to the following 
authorities ( Goatman v. lhdler, 191 Cal. 245, 251 [216 P. 35] ; 
De Sepulveda v. Baugh, 74 Cal. 468, 474 [16 P. 223, 5 Am. 
St.Rep. 455]; Kittle v. Lang, 107 Cal.App.2d 604, 612 [237 
P.2d 673]; McLean v. Laclewig, 2 Cal.App.2d 21, 25-26 [37 
P.2d 502] ; Newport v. Hatton, 195 Cal. 132, 156 [231 P. 
.Jan.1954] FLYNN v. FLYNN 
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; Rosenthal v. 100 Cal. 83 P. 624]), 
is disapproved. 
In Goatrnan v. lhiller, s?tpra, an erroneous description of 
certain real property involved in a lease was carried over into 
the findings and judgment in an action on the lease. The 
trial court granted plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint, 
findings and judgment mtnc pro tunc to give the correct de-
scription. The court there said: "Moreover, it is not ques-
tioned that the description of the land originally contained 
in the judgment is erroneous. Therefore, the only effect of 
a reversal of the order would be to remit respondents to an 
action in equity, in which they clearly would be entitled to 
have the judgment amended. (Y mmg v. Fink, 119 Cal. 107 
l50 Pac. 1060]; In re McGrew, supra [183 Cal. 177 (190 P. 
804)] .) To obviate any such further proceedings, let the 
order be affirmed.'' 
In De Septtlvecla v. Baugh, sttpra, a quiet title action was 
involved. A. certain tract was described by metes and bounds 
with an exception which was described as being recorded in 
certain numbered books, on certain numbered pages, in the 
records of Los Angeles County. 'rhe court there held that 
while the description was not an ''ideal'' one, it was not 
uncertain or doubtful and that the judgment was not "void." 
The reference here was to public records. 
In Newport v. Hatton, supra, an action to establish the 
right of plaintiffs in certain land and to the proceeds of the 
sale thereof was involved. The question was which 75 acres 
of the south half of a certain quarter section was involved. 
'fhere the court refused to declare the judgment a nullity 
because of the defective description and said that whether or 
not the description was defective must be tested by rules of 
evidence applied ordinarily to the subject. 
In Rosenthal v. Matthews, supra, another description of 
land was involved. 'l'he complaint definitely and correctly 
described the premises; the judgment described it correctly 
but excepted from its effect certain parts of the land ''as 
were sown to grain by the defendant during the fall of 1890 
and the winter of 1891." The court held that the land could 
be identified by extraneous evidence ''as in cases of the 
removal or destruction of stakes or other monuments called 
for in deeds and patents.'' 
In McLean v. Ladewig, St(,pra, a quiet title action was 
involved. It was held there that when property is well de-
42 C.2d-3 
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scribed by name, a conveyance by that designation is sufficient 
and a subsequent particular description could not be held to 
be used in the sense of restriction. 
In Kittle v. Lang, snpra, it was said: "It is true that find-
ings, as well as the judgment based thereon, should be defin~te 
and certain. .At least they should be sufficiently clear and 
definite to enable a party to comply with their requirements . 
. . . The judgment here involved is merely an order to the 
defendant to turn over to plaintiff such part of the personal 
property assets of the partnership now in defendant's pos-
session as are described in Exhibit I, which exhibit is made 
a part of the findings and judgment by reference. Defendant 
admitted he still had in his possession much of this equipment 
but claimed title to it under the terms of the quitclaim deed, 
which deed the court found was ineffective as to this particular 
personal property. 
''As between the parties to this action, we believe the find-
ings and judgment, in this respect, are sufficiently clear and 
definite to enable defendant to comply with its requirements." 
It is quite apparent that the Kittle case is the only one 
of these at all like the case at bar or the Price case which has 
been erroneously disapproved. In all the others, defective 
descriptions of real property 1vere involved and, in all of them, 
it was possible to make certain the deficiency. In a divorce 
action where the property settlement agreement of the parties 
is not sufficiently incorporated into the interlocutory and final 
decrees, an action may still be brought on the agreement itself 
but, in my opinion, may not be brought to enforce the judg-
ment because there is nothing in the judgment to enforce. It 
is also apparent that a majority of this court really believes 
that the agreement was insufficiently incorporated in the de-
cree, for they say : '' 'rhese considerations may justify modi-
fying the interlocutory decree on appeal to require that the 
agreement be attached to the decree. \Ve do not believe, 
however, that they are sufficient to require us to hold that 
the decree, now final, is insufficient to effect its clearly stated 
intent." 
This case adds a great deal to the confusion which has 
heretofore existed as to what constitutes an incorporation. 
To say that the facts here present a sufficient incorporation 
and then to say that the interlocutory decree, which is now 
final, may be modifiecl on appeal to require attachment of the 
ag1·eement thereto is the height of absurdity. It also is an 
effective trap designed to catch both wary and unwary attor-
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neys who are trying to honestly and conscientiously protect 
their clients' interests. Under the holding here, it is absolutely 
impossible for attorneys to know whether this court will, 
years later, determine that there was an incorporation, or 
order one whether or not it was intended at the time of the 
interlocutory decree. 
In my opinion there was no incorporation here. 
The proper rule and the rule which should prevail is that 
a valid agreement between husband and wife fixing the right 
of support or alimony following divorce, even though it is 
not integrated with a property settlement, cannot be altered 
by the court in the ensuing divorce action, or, if incorporated 
in the decree, the latter may not be modified, unless the agree-
ment so provides. Such an agreement may, of course, be 
disregarded if it is tainted with fraud or there is overreaching. 
However, after merger in the decree, the decree is not subject 
to modification except to the extent that ordinary judgments 
are subject to attack. This is the logical result which flows 
from Adams v. Adams, 29 Cal.2c1 621 [177 P.2d 265]. We 
there held that separation agreements in which the support 
and maintenance provisions are so interwoven that they con-
stitute a part of a division of the property of the parties, 
and thus not in the nature of alimony, are not subject to 
modification either before or after merger except as mentioned 
in the above stated rule. It was said in the Adams case 
(p. 624) that: "Property settlement agreements occupy a 
favored position in the law of this state and are sanctioned 
by the Civil Code. (Hill v. Hill, 23 Cal.2d 82, 89 [142 P.2c1 
417]; Hensley v. Hensley, 179 Cal. 284, 287 [183 P. 445]; 
Civ. Code, §§ 158, 159.) Such agreements are usually made 
with the advice of counsel after careful negotiations, and 
the courts, in accord with legislative sanction, prefer agree-
ment rather than litigation. (Hill v. Hill, supra at p. 89.) 
"When the parties have finally agreed upon the division of 
their property, the courts are loath to disturb their agreement 
except for ~.quitable considerations. A property settlement 
agreement, therefore, that is not tainted by fraud or com-
pulsion or is not in violation of the confidential relationship 
of the parties is valid anil binding on the court. (Hough v. 
Hmlgh, 26 Ca1.2d 605, 614 [160 P.2d 15]; Estate of Belknap, 
66 Cal.App.2d 644, 651-652 [152 P.2c1 657] ; Baxter v. Baxter, 
3 Cal.App.2d 676, 681 [40 P.2d 536]; Brown v. Brown, 83 
Cal.App. 74, 82 [256 P. 595]; McCahan v. McCahan, 47 Cal. 
App. 176,183 [190 P. 460] .) 
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'' . . The contract may even provide solely for support 
and maintenance without reference to a division of property. 
These contracts, if equitable, are enforceable even though not 
""~'Pnti><J to the court in a divorce action.'' Those principles 
were stated as to "property settlement agreements," yet they 
are equally to agreements for alimony. It is true 
that agreements property rights are specifically au-
thorized the statute but the same is also true as to agree-
ments for alimony. Section 158 of the Civil Code provides that: 
"Either husband or wife may enter into any engagement or 
transaction with the other, or with any other person, respect-
ing property, which either might if unmarried." Section 159 
reads: ''A lmsband and wife cannot, by any contract with 
each alter their legal relations, except as to property, 
and that they may agree, in writing, to an immediate 
separation, and may make provision for the support of either 
of them and of their children during such separation." 
(Emphasis added.) And further indicating the propriety of 
such agreements, section 175 provides: ''A husband aban-
doned his wife is not liable for her support until she offers 
to unless she was justified, by his misconduct, in 
abandoning· him; nor is he liable for her support when she 
is living separate from him, by agreement, unless such support 
is stipulated in the agreement." Sueh agreements are en-
forceable and binding upon the parties, if equitable, even 
though not presented to the court in the divorce action. 
(Adams v. Adams, supra, 29 Cal.2d 621, 624; Sanborn v. 
Sanborn, 3 Cal.App.2d 437 [39 P.2d 830]; Brown v. Brown, 
83 Cal.App. 74 [256 P. 595].) 
There are cases that hold or state that the incorporation 
of a support agreement in the divorce decree does not prevent 
the modification of the decree. (See Adams v. Adams, sttpra, 
29 Cal.2d 621; Ho~tgh v. Hough, snpra, 26 Cal.2d 605; Ptwkett 
v. Puckett, 21 Cal.2d 833 f136 P .2d 1] ; and cases cited in 
those Those cases are based on the theory that the 
court in an action for divorce has general power over alimony 
and that such power cannot be taken away by agreement of 
the parties as to alimony either when considering the question 
in the divorce action, or in considering the question of modifi-
cation of the decree, where the agreement has been incor-
porated in the deeree, because it has power to determine fault 
npon which an award of may depend ( Civ. Code, 
§ 139) ; and that there is a public policy against the possi-
bility that the care of the spouse will become a public charge 
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where the agreement does not make In 
regard to permanent section 139 of the Civil Code 
provides that when the divorce is for an offense of 
the husband, the court "may" provide for the wife's support 
by him and ''may'' modify its orders on that subject. The 
court "may" require the payment of temporary alimony-
support during the pendency of the action. ( Civ. Code, 
§ 137.) It will be noted that the authority of the court is 
stated in permissive rather than mandatory language. 'l'he 
wording does not exclude the propriety of the parties contract-
ing on the subject or the court being bound by the contract. 
Those sections must be read in conjunction with section 159, 
s1tpra, which expressly authorizes those contracts. It is not 
to be supposed that the Legislature would expressly authorize 
those contracts and at the same time leave it to the whim or 
caprice of the divorce court whether any effect was to be 
given to them. The right of freedom of contract given by 
section 159, supra, certainly eliminates any argument that a 
married woman is not competent to contract or that she needs 
any protection by the court that is not afforded to other 
contracting parties. Moreover, it must be noted that the 
court in the divorce action is given the authority to divide 
the community property of the spouses according to various 
fault factors ( Civ. Code, § 146, which provides that community 
property "shall" be assigned as there set forth), yet it is 
held by a legion of cases that a contract dividing such prop-
erty when presented to the court in the divorce action is . 
binding: j)!l the court. (Adams v. Adams, supra, 29 Cal.2d 
6!h, a:r;d cases cited supra.) The same construction should 
be given to sections 137 and 139 of the Civil Code. It is 
true that nothing is said in section 146, as there is in section 
139, about modifying the property division orders of the 
court, which is understandable because that is done by one 
act and does not involve the doing· of a series of acts in the 
future like monthly payments for support, and I am referring 
to the holdings that the property division contract is binding 
on the court when p1'esented in the divorce action. The fact 
that the code sections authorize giving consideration to fault 
of the parties in the award of alimony requires no different 
result because the same is true of a community property 
division, and as the parties are free to contract as to support 
( Civ. Code, § 159, supra), they may in their negotiations give 
consideration to that factor. I would hold, therefore, that 
there is nothing in the Civil Code sections discussed which 
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prevents giving effect to a purely support contract, nor which 
makes the decree subject to modification when the contract 
is merged therein. 
The policy factors are not persuasive. The statute (Civ. 
Code, § 159) expressly declares the policy that the parties may 
contract on this subject. If ~hey may, effect should be given 
to their contracts. Being fully advised, they have made 
their choice on the question of support. Having made the 
arrangement, they are entitled to have it be given stability 
in order that each may arrange his future affairs with some 
degree of certainty. If future contingencies might alter the 
situation they may provide for them in their contracts. Indeed, 
terms in the contract giving flexibility to it would be desir-
able and easily achieved. Courts do not make new contracts 
or disregard contracts which the parties have made on a 
subject concerning which they may lawfully contract: (6 Cal. 
,Jur. 326 et seq.) 
Of course, the parties need not contract unless they desire 
to do so. They may leave the determination to the court. 
If they do contract but do not present it to the court in the 
action and the court makes a determination on the subject of 
support, then they have waived the contract as fixing their 
rights and obligations; the decree then is the measure of their 
rights and duties. If the contract is presented to the court 
and is approved but not embodied in the decree as heretofore 
described, then their remedy is on the contract and not the 
deeree. Such is the case at bar. 
